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Is “Cultural Recognition” a Useful Concept for Leftist Politics?

ABSTRACT

It is not clear that “cultural recognition” should be a central goal of leftist politics. The idea that cultures have value simply by virtue of being cultures seems absurd, so it might be better to talk simply about eliminating prejudice and stigmatisation.

KEYWORDS: cultural recognition, difference, equality, American left, cultural studies

Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser are among the most widely read and discussed philosophers in the USA. I want to discuss a point on which I differ from both of them - the utility of the notion of “cultural recognition.” They take for granted that this notion is, or should be, at or near the centre of leftist political thinking. I doubt this, and will use this occasion to say why.

I frequently assign articles by Butler and Fraser to my students. They read those assignments with relish and appreciation, and the ensuing class discussion is often unusually lively. The students typically find the notions of

“culture” and “cultural recognition” as important as do Butler and Fraser, and are baffled by my doubts about their utility. They regard my attempts to brush these notions aside, and my scepticism about the recent vogue of “cultural studies” in departments of literature, as symptoms of blindness to the current political situation. When I suggest that the growing “cultural studies” literature does not amount to much as a form of leftist political activity, they sharply disagree. They do the same when I suggest, as I did in my book *Achieving our Country*, that the American academic left overestimates the utility of philosophy, and that terms like “deconstruction,” “subject-position” and “power” are of little help in deliberating about what is to be done.¹

In discussion with students concerning these matters, I often have the feeling of just not getting it. I suspect that I am missing something, and that the rising generation may glimpse something I do not. Even if this is the case, however, it may be useful for me to lay out my persisting doubts in some detail. Setting them down might help clarify the differences between habits of mind characteristic of my generation, whose leftism is a product of the 1940s and 1950s, and those characteristic of people whose leftism took shape in the 1970s and 1980s, and owed a great deal to memories of the 1960s.

A few decades ago, the term “culture” rarely came up in political discussion. The idea that we should assign “positive value” to many different cultures had not yet surfaced, except in specifically anthropological contexts. In those days, American leftists talked about the need to overcome prejudice against stigmatised groups rather than about the need to grant recognition to the cultures of these groups. The central leftist idea then was that we all share a common humanity, and that this commonality makes us fit to be citizens of the same nations, to marry each others’ brothers and sisters, and so on. The notion of “respect for differences” had not yet made its appearance.

Up through the Sixties, “prejudice” was the word leftists used to signify inability to acknowledge this commonality, and a consequent failure to treat other people fairly. To say that someone is prejudiced, in this sense, is to say that he or she prejudges fellow-humans who are members of despised groups. Prejudiced people assume that membership in such a group trumps everything else - that no feature of intellect or character can redeem such membership, and that the stigma of membership in the despised group makes marriage, friendship, and other cherished forms of association very difficult.

Such people are reluctant to think of members of despised groups as fellow-citizens. They assume that people who bear a certain ineradicable stigma are not worth knowing, much less talking with about public affairs.

Many people - especially poor people - gain great benefits from being prejudiced. For they can maintain their own sense of worth by contrasting themselves with purported natural inferiors. Their prejudices are integral to their self-respect. In America, the paradigm of this phenomenon was the need of poor whites in the post-slavery South to take pride in not being "niggers." This need drove them to maintain and defend a system in which African-Americans were treated as only semi-human.

People like these poor whites think of the members of stigmatised groups as degraded specimens of humanity, people whom they would be disgusted to think of their sister or brother marrying. The blood of such people carries pollution. Similarly, many straight men and women would feel blemished by physical proximity to a homosexual, and would regard themselves as having been permanently damaged should they once take part in a homosexual act. These are a few among many examples of the sort of patterns of exclusion which became institutionalised in the caste systems of India, Japan, and many other places. Whole societies have been organised around ideas of purity and pollution. These are the societies the left has always hoped may someday be replaced by a society in which no human being is regarded as anything less than a full-fledged member of both the species and the local community.

In the old days, American leftists assumed that creating a decent and civilised society was in part a matter of redistributing money and opportunity, and in part a matter of erasing stigma by eliminating prejudice. The two efforts were assumed to go hand in hand. No theoretical problems arose about how to integrate the two, though many practical problems did. In those days, the question of whether blacks, or members of lower castes, or manual workers, or women, or homosexuals, had a culture of their own - one which it behooved their oppressors to understand and appreciate - did not often arise.

All this was before the rise of second-wave feminism. That movement owed a great deal to the example set by Dr. King's Civil Rights Movement, as did the movement for gay and lesbian rights. But though gay and lesbian activists could speak of the need to eliminate prejudice and stigma, that terminology

did not work well as a description of the changes for which feminists were working. The humiliation of women by men is not happily described as a result of men's *prejudice* against women. Being a woman is not exactly a matter of bearing a *stigma*. Women as a group are not scapegoated in the way blacks or Jews are. Scapegoats must be driven out or killed, whereas wives are too useful to be dispensed with. A man's connection with a woman is thought to pollute him only in occasional, special, circumstances.

"Recognition," however, is a term which works equally well to describe what blacks need from whites, gays need from straights, and women need from men. They all need to be recognised as full members of the species, sharing in the common humanity that straight white males, within a given local community, typically take for granted in their dealings with one another. When the new social movements, with second-wave feminism in the vanguard, tried to bring their struggles under a common rubric, "the need for recognition" seemed more apposite than "the need to eliminate prejudice."

It is less clear, however, why "recognition" came to be thought of as recognition of *culture* or of "cultural differences," rather than as recognition of a common humanity. One reason may be that a claim frequently made about stigmatised people has been that they lacked, and would forever be unable to acquire, culture - culture in the older, Arnoldian, sense. A similar inability was, until very recently, attributed to women by men: they might acquire a kind of lightweight culture (centred around piano-playing and novel-reading) but not the sort of heavyweight culture required to become, for example, professors or legislators. So one part of granting recognition to black Americans, manual labourers, and women, was to concede that they too had the kind of dense, comforting, web of associations, memories, and traditions which the ruling males had thought unique to themselves (and which they sometimes thought could be had only by people with an old fashioned classical education). Raymond Williams' work was particularly important in changing the intellectuals' way of using the term "culture" to mean something less Arnoldian and more anthropological.

It helps, when trying to recognise a common humanity in a person of another gender, class, or ethnicity, to think of them as having as rich an inner life as one does oneself. To picture such an inner life, it helps to know something about the web of memories and associations which make it up. So one way

to help eliminate prejudice and erase stigma is to point out that, for example, women have a history, that homosexuals take pride in belonging to the same stigmatised group as Proust, and that African-Americans have detailed memories of the battles which make up what Russell Banks calls "the three hundred year War Between The Races in America" - the sort of memories whites are currently learning about from Toni Morrison's novels. It helps to realise that all such groups wrap a comforting blanket of memories and traditions, customs and institutions, around themselves, just as do classical scholars, old Etonians, or members of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks.

Yet drawing attention to this fact is hardly the only way to eliminate prejudice. Another way is to get the prejudiced to see the stigmatised as having the same tendency to bleed when pricked as they themselves: they too worry about their children and parents; they are possessed by the same self-doubts, and lose self-confidence when humiliated; their difficulties in moving from one stage of life to another are much like everyone else's, despite the fact that their life-chances may be minimal. These ways of emphasising commonality rather than difference have little to do with "cultural recognition." They have to do with experiences shared by members of all cultures and all historical epochs, and which remain pretty much the same despite cultural change.

So we still need an explanation of why cultural recognition is thought so important. I think one reason it has become so important in the discourse of the American academic left may be the result of a specifically academic set of circumstances. The only thing we academics can do, in our specifically professional capacities, to eliminate prejudice is to write women's history, celebrate black artistic achievements, and the like. This is what academics who work in such programs as Women's Studies, African-American Studies, and Gay Studies do best. These programs are the academic arms of the new social movements - the movements which, as Judith Butler rightly says, have kept the left alive in the United States in recent years, years during which the rich have consistently had the best of it in the class struggle.

When these academic programs were set up, their founders could not describe themselves as attempting to use the tax-supported resources of the higher education system to pursue political goals - the description preferred by rightist opponents of these programs. Yet the rightists' description was, as far as

it went, accurate enough. These programs are, among other things, attempts to continue doing what colleges and universities have, thank God, been doing more and more in recent times: helping the societies which they serve become more generous and tolerant. Still, you cannot persuade a university faculty to institute a new academic program by pointing out that such a program will help change the manners and morals of the citizenry for the better - that it will correct the opinions of the students, and cause them to be less prejudiced than their parents. You need to describe the projected new program as pursuing some apolitical, purely academic, purpose. So those who set up such programs often said that they would devote themselves to studying the *culture* of one or another stigmatised group, an area which previous scholarship had neglected.

I suspect that this pragmatic accommodation to the customs of academic life did a lot to insure that “cultural recognition” would replace “eliminating prejudice” as a leftist political goal. It may help explain why American leftists now talk about recognition of difference rather than about recognition of a common humanity. For the vast majority of leftists in the US now are, we must sadly admit, academics. It is tempting for any group to think that the means they have found to promote a decent and civilised society are essential means to that goal - that any program for reaching that goal must feature their own speciality.

The generation of academics whose political views were formed in the Sixties became, after McGovern’s defeat in 1972, distrustful of the idea of reform, and of appeals to the good judgement of an electorate which had re-elected Nixon by a landslide. Because all the campaigning for McGovern had come to nothing, it seemed unlikely that envelope-licking, leafleting, picketing, demonstrating, and similar modes of participating in the political progress would do much good. So it was tempting for this generation to think that perhaps they could promote a cultural, rather than a political revolution - one which would eventually do some political good.

As I said in *Achieving Our Country*, a kind of cultural revolution actually took place. Between 1972 and the present the treatment of women, African-Americans and gays by American institutions and American straight white males improved enormously, thanks in large measure to the generation of teachers that entered the schools, colleges and universities between 1975 and

1990. But, as I also said in that book, nothing much has been done by that generation to help underpaid straight white males make more money. Culture pushed economics aside, in part because the maturing Sixties leftists had a lot of ideas about cultural change, but few ideas about how to counter Reagan's soak-the-poor policies, what to do for the unemployed in the Rust Belt, or how to make sure that a global economy did not pauperise American wage-earners. Because culture pushed economics aside, the straight white male working class in America may find it tempting to think that the leftist academy is uninterested in its problems.

Nowadays, as Nancy Fraser says, "demands for 'recognition of difference' fuel struggles of groups mobilised under the banners of nationality, ethnicity, 'race,' gender, and sexuality."² But I am not sure that such demands add anything useful to the old demand that these groups not be (in Fraser's words) "routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions."³ The difference between the old and the new demands is the difference between asking not to be singled out for ill-treatment and asking for attention to, and respect for, one's distinctive features. The new demand is harder to meet than the older, and I am not sure that there is any good reason for the change from the easier to the more stringent demand.

The only plausible explanation I can give for this change is that the post-Sixties academic left knows a lot about these differences, and thinks that the public as a whole ought to take an interest in them. This phenomenon strikes me as analogous to the Marxist students of the Thirties knowing a lot about dialectical materialism, and concluding that the members of the UAW ought to take an interest in this subject, lest they succumb to the temptations of bourgeois, non-revolutionary, trade unionism. Those students, like the present generation of leftist academics, desperately wanted to be of use to those who were getting the dirty end of the stick. So they overestimated the importance of their own expertise. The attempt to put "cultural recognition" on a par with redistribution seems to me the result of a similar overestimation: the academics are desperately eager to assure themselves that what they are doing is central, rather than marginal, to leftist politics.

Like Fraser, I quite agree with Charles Taylor that disrespect dictated by prejudice, or by the age-old assumption that women are second-rate members

of the species, can “inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-hatred.”⁴ I also agree with Axel Honneth’s Hegelian claim that “we owe our integrity . . . to the receipt of approval or recognition from other persons.”⁵ We are crippled unless most of the people we encounter treat us as conversable and as trustworthy partners in co-operative projects. But the idea that we need recognition *as members of a particular community, rather than as individuals* is not prominent in Hegel, and is not intuitively evident. The Hegelian dialectic of master and slave, a dialectic easily rewritten as that of husband and wife, does not take place between cultures but between individuals.

David Bromwich, in his *Politics by Other Means*, has pointed out that the change from “eliminating prejudice” to “recognising cultural differences” has produced confusion on the left because it runs athwart everything individualistic in recent Western ways of thinking - everything that suggests that we want, and should want, to be recognised either simply as human, or else for our individual traits and achievements.⁶ This suggestion has been central to most of the left’s rhetoric since the French Revolution. It is hard to integrate this rhetoric with an insistence on the importance of cultural differences.

The old individualistic - and, at the limit, existentialist - ways of thinking suggest that a young person should not focus on what she owes to her ancestors, her parents, or the community from which she comes, but rather on how she might break free of all those, and become who she is. We think well of someone who refuses to be stereotyped as an X, resents being thought of as an X, and tries to create a self-image for herself which escapes all the classificatory terminologies employed by those around her. If someone chooses *not* to break free from her roots, and instead tries to develop a self-image to which group membership is central, we think it important that this decision be fully conscious and entirely free, rather than being treated as the recognition of an evident duty.

This admiration for self-creating independence has nothing to do with a belief in the Cartesian ego, and is entirely compatible with the claim that our selves are social constructions - with the realisation that our selves are contingent products of interactions with other people, and that these interactions are largely governed by what Foucault calls “power.” One can agree with Foucault that all choices among alternative beliefs are made within the limits of the truth-candidates available at the time, and that these truth-candidates are

available only because somebody had the power to suppress other candidates, while still retaining the individualistic, quasi-Nietzschean, ways of thinking that make us prize self-creation. (Foucault was himself, and knew himself to be, an admirable example of such self-creation).

Nor does the recognition of our common humanity have anything to do with Kantian or Habermasian universalism. Such recognition is not a matter of believing that our consciences can be relied upon to give us the same instructions, or that moral and political discussion will converge to agreement, thanks to what Habermas and Apel call “the force of the better argument.” As I said above, it is much more a matter of coming to think of previously despised people as like oneself in specific, concrete, banal ways: as bleeding when pricked, and crippled when shunned.

I think that if the left had continued to try to eliminate prejudice by emphasising such commonalities, rather than emphasising cultural differences, it might have been able to effect the same cultural revolution as in fact occurred. I doubt that the term “culture” added much weight or force to efforts to get people to treat previously despised groups as fellow-humans. So I would rephrase Fraser’s statement that “The remedy for cultural injustice is some sort of cultural or symbolic change” in old-fashioned terms as “The remedy for thinking of people as, first and foremost, members of traditionally despised groups is to emphasise what these people share with those who despise them.”⁷

Fraser goes on to say “This [remedy] could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups. It could also involve recognising and positively valorising cultural diversity.”⁸ I agree that it *could*, but it could also involve raising kids not to think much about whether people are black or female or gay or Navajo - to raise them so that they will see little point in questions like “What must it be like [to be a woman (or to be gay)]?” or “In what does black (or Navajo) identity consist?” or “Which cultural products are pre-eminently associated with being African-American? Vietnamese-American? Mexican-American?”

While reading Fraser’s article, I kept asking myself what would be lost if one crossed out the word “cultural” in such contexts as “[homosexuals’] mode of collectivity is that of a despised sexuality, rooted in the cultural-valuational structure of society” or “homophobia: the cultural devaluation

of homosexuality.”⁹ I kept wondering why in order to overcome homophobia we had to “accord positive recognition to gay and lesbian sexual specificity” rather than just raising children to think that being gay or lesbian is no big deal.¹⁰ I wondered why, in order to overcome ethnic prejudice against recent immigrants, we had to try to interest people in these immigrants’ native cultures.

Such doubts made me sceptical about the need for what Fraser calls “deconstruction,” thought of as “deep restructuring of relations of recognition . . . blurring group differentiation.”¹¹ I am not sure that in order to eliminate prejudice we need a “transformative recognition politics of deconstruction.”¹² Do we really need to replace “hierarchical racial dichotomies” by “demassified and shifting networks of multiple intersecting differences” rather than just, for example, trying to bring up white kids to think less about differences in skin colour and more about shared pains and pleasures?¹³ Doing the latter would accomplish what Fraser calls weaning white people “from their attachment to current cultural constructions of their interests and identities” insofar as it would make it unimportant for white kids to think of themselves as white.¹⁴ Granted that white kids badly need to learn the history of the War Between the Races, that is not the same thing as learning to appreciate the merits of a distinctively black culture.

I find much to admire in Fraser’s analyses of the problems confronting the contemporary left, and I am more or less on her side in her disagreements with Iris Marion Young and with Judith Butler.¹⁵ Still, I think that “deconstruction” is a fancier, more sophisticated, weapon than the left needs. Fraser’s suggestion that “deconstruction” be elevated to a par with “socialism” among leftist aims seems to me to smell of the lamp. Spotting latent incoherence in ideas, identities, and institutions, in the Derridean manner, is something people trained in various recently founded academic programs are often good at. But I doubt that this additional skill makes them any better equipped to help our society eliminate prejudice and increase fairness than, for example, training in battered women’s shelters, AIDS support groups, or Head Start programs for black kids in the ghettos.

Fraser says that “the intersection of class, ‘race,’ gender, and sexuality intensifies the need for transformative solutions, making the combination of socialism and deconstruction more attractive still.”¹⁶ I cannot see the relevance of this

intersection to anything as philosophically sophisticated as deconstruction. The intersection seems to amount merely to such facts as that someone may be humiliated or discriminated against for being a woman in the morning, for being black in the afternoon, and for being a lesbian in the evening, and low-paid for any or all of these three reasons. The remedies for this situation do not seem to me to have anything to do with questions about her "identity" as any of these. I am not sure that she will be helped by attending to the construction of such an identity, or that her persecutors will be helped by recognising it once it has been constructed.

Nor does it help to think about possible remedies when Judith Butler, describing the differences between social movements which may attempt alliances, reminds us of the "the self-difference of movement itself, a constitutive rupture that makes movements possible on nonidentitarian grounds, that installs a certain mobilising conflict as the basis of politicisation."¹⁷ As a fellow student of Hegel and Derrida, I can see what she means when she says that "difference is the condition of the possibility of identity, or, rather its constitutive limit" but I do not see the relevance of this philosophical point to the problems encountered in getting movements to relieve the situation of African-Americans together with, for example, movements to relieve that of lesbians. It strikes me as about as *merely* philosophical as a point can get.

Butler says a bit later that:

When new social movements are cast as so many "particularisms" in search of an overriding universal, it will be necessary to ask how the rubric of a universal itself only became possible through the erasure of the prior workings of social power. This is not to say that universals are impossible, but only that one abstracted from its location in power will always be falsifying and territorialising, and calls to be resisted at every level.¹⁸

I doubt the "always," and I do not see the relevance of the claim. In what sense does anybody want to bring the various new social movements under "a universal"? Negotiating local and provisional alliances between these movements (as when one movement offers votes, or money, or live bodies, to another) does not require finding a relevant "universal." Urging, as I have, that these new social movements need to get themselves hitched up, in the present American situation, to attempts to improve the lot of unemployed or

ludicrously ill-paid straight white males, is not a matter of subsuming them under a universal. It is more like urging that taking several different medicines at once will have a desirable synergistic effect.

In the pages from which I have quoted, Butler is concerned to respond to people who claim that, as she puts it, "the cultural focus of leftist politics has splintered the Left into identitarian sects," with the result that we have "lost a set of common ideals and goals."¹⁹ Todd Gitlin, Arthur Schlesinger and I have indeed said things of this sort. But I cannot see the relevance of Butler's philosophical points to our complaints, which are about the dangerous consequences of developing a left that neglects class and money by focusing on the elimination of prejudice and sexism. I, and probably Gitlin and Schlesinger as well, would never dream of calling the new social movements "a self-centred and trivial form of politics."²⁰ Nor do we have an interest in exchanging these movements for "a more robust, serious and comprehensive vision of the systematic interrelatedness of social and economic conditions."²¹ Doubtless there are such interrelations, but getting them mapped out is not a prerequisite for undertaking leftist initiatives which would serve the purposes of both the newer social movements and the older ones.

Fraser thinks it important to work out such a vision. Although I admire the philosophical acuity she brings to the production of analytical categories, I do not share her sense of priorities. Nor do I think that there is any way to put Fraser in the same box with Gitlin, Schlesinger and myself, as Butler seems to do. All that the three of us share with Fraser is that, like her, we should like to figure out a way to produce a stronger American left, a left which might become a voting majority of citizens. We all want to facilitate alliances between the victims of the Republicans' soak-the-poor legislation and people who are stigmatised, or deprived, for reasons other than poverty. The two groups overlap, but are not identical, and the Republicans are getting good at playing them off against each other.

Though I take it Butler too would like to help create a leftist majority among American voters, I doubt that the philosophical sophistication she brings to bear on questions of identity and difference will be of much use to the left in its attempt to pursue majoritarian politics. I am happy to agree that this sort of philosophical sophistication has been put to good use in the process of building up the academic wings of the new movements. But I see Butler

as running together problems of academic politics with larger problems, and of trying to squeeze more political utility out of philosophical sophistication than she is likely to get. Butler says that:

Within the academy, the effort to separate race studies from sexuality studies from gender studies marks various needs for autonomous articulation, but it also produces a set of important, painful, and promising confrontations that expose the ultimate limits to any such autonomy: the politics of sexuality within African American studies; the politics of race within queer studies, within the study of class, within feminism; the question of misogyny within any of the above, the question of homophobia within feminism - to name a few. This may seem to be precisely the tedium of identitarian struggles that a new, more inclusive left hopes to transcend.²²

As I see it, however, it is not a matter of transcending these struggles, but of broadening the horizons of those who engage in them - of producing leftist students who spend less time thinking about efforts to separate, or not to separate, these various studies from one another. My own hunch is that they need to spend more time thinking about what will happen if American wages continue to sink toward the level of the global wage market. But whether I am right in this hunch or not, the question of what our students should be thinking about if the American Left is to grow stronger is a purely practical, and presently quite urgent, question. It is a question to which Derrida and Foucault are no more relevant than are Aquinas and Leibniz.

The philosophers who seem to me most useful for leftist students are the old standbys - Mill and Dewey. Mill was right to urge that the aim of social institutions should be the encouragement of the greatest possible human diversity. But we should think of this diversity as he did, as a diversity of self-creating individuals, rather than a diversity of cultures. Our utopian dreams should be of a world in which cultures are seen as transitory comings-together of individuals - expedients for increasing human happiness rather than as the principal source of a person's sense of self-worth.

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Notes

- ¹ Richard Rorty, *Achieving our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America*, Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 1998.
- ² Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Postsocialist' Age," *New Left Review*, July / August 1995, no. 212, p. 68.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- ⁴ Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992, p. 25.
- ⁵ Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on a Theory of Recognition," *Political Theory*, May 1992, vol. 20. no. 2, p. 188.
- ⁶ David Bromwich, *Politics by Other Means: Higher Education and Group Thinking*, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992.
- ⁷ Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?," p. 73.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- ¹⁵ See Fraser's two chapters "Culture, Political Economy and Difference: On Iris Young's *Justice and the Politics of Difference*" and "False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler" in *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition*, Routledge: New York, 1996. See also, N. Fraser, "Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler," *Social Text*, 52/3, vol. 15, nos. 3 & 4, Fall/Winter, 1997, pp. 279-89.
- ¹⁶ Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?," p. 91.
- ¹⁷ Judith Butler, "Merely Cultural," *Social Text*, 52/3, vol. 15, nos. 3 & 4, Fall/Winter, 1997, p. 269.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-70.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 265.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 269.